Abstract
Introduction 1
McFadden (1981), Small and Rosen (1981) , and Hanemann (1984) were amongst the first to establish 2 the theoretical connection between discrete choice modelling, specifically the Random Utility 3
Maximisation (RUM) model, and welfare economics. Batley and Ibanez (2013a) provide a 4 comprehensive overview of this literature, but more importantly also provide five assumptions under 5 which the indirect utility function is consistent with economic theory. Additive Income RUM 6 (AIRUM; McFadden 1981), for which the indirect utility function is linear in prices and income, 7 adheres to these five assumptions and provides discrete choice modellers with its most well-known 8 monetary measure of consumer surplus, i.e. the LogSum (e.g. Cochrane, 1975; De Jong et al. 2007) . 9
10
In discrete choice models, (changes in) choice probabilities are an appropriate way to reflect (changes 11 in) behaviour in response to price or quality (changes). When demand is restricted to unity and the 12
Batley and Ibanez (2013a) assumptions are fulfilled, then the choice probability can be interpreted as a 13 probabilistic demand curve. Williams (1977) and Ben-Akiva and Lerman (1985) accordingly calculate 14 (changes in) the area underneath the demand curve to derive a Marshallian measure of consumer 15 surplus which coincides with the Hicksian LogSum measure under AIRUM (e.g. McConnell 1995) . 16
17
The five assumptions put forward by Batley and Ibanez (2013a) are, however, conflicting with many 18 of the behavioural phenomena observed in recent empirical studies, such as compromise effects (e.g. 19 Boeri et al. 2012 ), cost damping (e.g. Batley 2016 ), heterogeneity in cost sensitivities across goods 20 (e.g. Hess et al. 2007 ) and non-linear income effects (e.g. Dagsvik and Karlström 2005) to name a few. 21 By relaxing some of the aforementioned assumptions we may be able to better explain empirically 22 observed behaviour. However, the resulting functional form for the choice probabilities can no longer 23 be interpreted as probabilistic demand functions since they no longer provide a solution to what is 24 known in the economic literature as the 'integrability problem' (e.g. Deaton and Muellbauer 1980) . As 25 a result, welfare analysis based on such inconsistent indirect utility functions is limited; or sometimes 26 argued to be meaningless. 27
Relaxing some of the aforementioned assumptions requires giving up the notion of a fully rational 1 consumer. This is a direct result of incorporating elements of irrationality, such as compromise effects 2 as done by the Random Regret Minimisation (RRM) model (Chorus 2010) , in the deterministic part of 3 the 'indirect utility' function used to estimate discrete choice models. This is in line with the notion 4 that not all irrational behaviour would be captured by the existence of an error term in the RUM 5 model. A potential solution emerges when one follows a line of reasoning proposed by McConnell 6 (1995), who states that "If there is a change in behaviour, there is also most likely a change in 7 welfare". In other words, if one is willing to accept that a model is viable representation of (potentially 8 irrational) choice behaviour, this opens a door towards meaningful welfare analysis, albeit -as we will 9
show below -in a limited number of cases. 10
11
The perspective we adopt is simple. Although for the behavioural phenomena described above choice 12 probabilities are still well-defined and they behave consistently and in a predictable fashion with 13 respect to price and quality changes, these choice probabilities can no longer be interpreted as 14 probabilistic demand functions. However, if we treat them 'as if they were', we are able to develop a 15 monetary analogue to the traditional Marshallian consumer surplus. Such an approximation will be 16 inherently imperfect and reflects the price paid for adopting a behavioural economics approach. We 17 will discuss its limitations in more detail in Section 5. The developed measure allows evaluating, in 18 monetary terms, the existence value of environmental goods and welfare implications of changes in 19 these environmental goods. 20
21
In this paper, we particularly focus on the Random Regret Minimisation (RRM) model (Chorus 2010) . 22
It is well-known for its ability to take compromise effects in individual decision-making into account 23 (e.g. Guevara and Fukushi 2016). The compromise effect arises in the RRM since bad performance on 24 one environmental attribute (e.g. water quality) can hardly be compensated by a very good 25 performance on another attribute (e.g. easy access). 1 The incorporation of RRM in the NLOGIT and 26 define the compensating variation CV in (2) where J refers to the choice set and the superscripts '0' 1 and '1' respectively define the utility before and after the change.
2 Due to the unobserved nature of ε, 2 the compensating variation is a random variable for which typically the expected value is derived for 3 the purpose of social welfare analysis. 4
6 7 It turns out that for the adopted AIRUM indirect utility function the CV in (3) is defined by the 8 difference in the expected maximum utility before and after the improvement divided by α, i.e. the 9 marginal utility of income (e.g. Small and Rosen 1981) . For the multinomial logit model the expected 10 maximum utility is defined by the 'LogSum' (e.g. Cochrane, 1975; De Jong et al. 2007 ). Note that the 11 unknown constant C in (3) drops out when identifying changes in expected maximum utility. also discussed by Ben-Akiva and Lerman (1985) . Here, the choice probability π i for alternative i is 17 viewed as the observed probabilistic demand function for alternative i. A change in environmental 18 policy will have an impact on the vector of indirect utilities V. Accordingly, the change in consumer 19 surplus arising from a change in environmental policy improving alternative i can be defined by (4). 20
As described by Ben-Akiva and Lerman (1985) , the integral is defined in utility terms and a common 21 money metric, in our case α, is required to translate this utility surplus into monetary terms. The implemented linear relationship between income (price) and utility ensures that the Marshallian 2 consumer surplus following any order of price changes is path independent, i.e. does not exhibit 3 income effects (Batley and Ibanez 2013b) . 4 As a result, the Marshallian consumer surplus, the 4
Hicksian compensating variation and the equivalent variation measures are identical. Welfare 5 calculations are possible for choice models with more flexible error specifications. For example, the 6 family of Multivariate Extreme Value models have closed form solutions that are reformulations of the 7 LogSum formula. Finally, 'translational variance' allows ignoring Y in (1) during estimation without 8 influencing choice probabilities and welfare estimates. 5 The inclusion of Y here is illustrative as it 9 makes explicit that consumers derive additional utility from spending their residual income on the 10 numeraire good. show that in the context of a discrete choice models, where demand is restricted to unity, non-linear 24 income effects are not consistent with economic theory. Any additional income must be spent on the 1 numeraire good which by definition has to be path independent, i.e. not subject to an income effect. 2 3 2.3 The RRM model -attribute level differences and non-linearity 4
We set out to develop an approximation of the Marshallian consumer surplus for the Random Regret 5
Minimisation (RRM) model as presented in equation (5) . A detailed description of the RRM model is 6 provided in Chorus (2010) , and a review of the model's core properties and empirical comparisons 7 between RRM and RUM models can be found in Chorus et al. (2014) . 8
The RRM model in (5) is particularly interested in differences in attribute levels across alternatives. 12
That is, regret R (alternatively interpretable as the negative of (decision) utility) arises when alternative that in the RRM model the change in choice probability is not only caused by an increase in the regret 5 of alternative i, but also by a simultaneous reduction in regret of all other alternatives j ≠ i. Changes in 6 p i might have a minor impact on R i , but the change in R j may be large such that π i is still affected. By 7 focusing on changes in probability rather than compensating for changes in regret our approach 8 significantly differs from the indifference based approach to marginal welfare measurement in the 9 RRM model discussed by Dekker (2014) . 
Value of having an alternative in the choice set 14
McConnell (1995) points out that the preceding logic can also be used to determine the value of 15 having (access to) a particular alternative in the choice set (up to a constant). Namely, by increasing 16 the price of an alternative (by means of introducing a hypothetical tax t i or alternative price levy) the 17 associated choice probability π i reduces to zero. The consumer surplus C i of having alternative i in 7 First, they provide a different starting point, i.e. choice probability, to (7). Second, the 16 shape of the probabilistic demand function varies between the two models. The marginal change in the 17 RUM-based choice probability due to levying a tax is given by (8). This change in For large t i , the derivative approaches ( )
Valuing changes in the attributes of a single alternative 3
Now moving to our third type of consumer surplus: changes in consumer surplus (i.e., the change in 4 existence value of the alternative) as a result of changing the attribute levels of alternative i. When 5 introducing changes in the non-price attributes of alternative i, the probabilistic demand curve in 6 Figure 1 shifts rather than that a change along the probabilistic demand curve is made. Accordingly, 7 the change in consumer surplus cannot be simply obtained by integrating over the change in price. 8
McConnell (1995) shows that the probabilistic demand function can, however, still be applied to 9 derive this particular change in value. Equation (10) then measures the difference in existence value 10 between the new and original situation as denoted by the superscripts '1'and '0' respectively. This 11 formulation can be applied to RUM, RRM and other well-behaved specifications of the choice model. The choice tasks were then generated using a 'optimal orthogonal in the differences' design (Street et 19 al. 2005) . 20 21 Table 1 provides an overview of the estimated model parameters for a linear-in-parameters RUM 22 model and the RRM model. All parameters are of the expected sign and it can be observed that α>2θ M 23 such that for very expensive alternatives the choice probability in the RRM model is decreasing more 24 rapidly than in the RUM model, in the context of this dataset. In Sections 4.2 and 4.3 we will focus on 25 two specific choice tasks (see Table 2 ), one with and one without a clear compromise alternative. We 26 expect that in the case of the former differences between the welfare effects between the RUM and 1 RRM model are larger due RRM's possibility to capture compromise effects. 2 3 The model parameters and attribute levels are combined to derive the model specific choice 6 probabilities (see Table 3 ), which serve as starting points for (7). The compromise alternative, Route B 7 in the first choice set, as expected receives a market share bonus in the RRM model compared to the 8 RUM model. Consequently, the other alternatives comprising more extreme attribute levels are 9 assigned a lower choice probability in the RRM model. Choice probabilities are more comparable 10 between RUM and RRM in the second choice set, in the absence of a clear compromise alternative. 11
These differences in starting points are also reflected in the alternative specific CS measures presented 12 in Table 3 . In the first choice set, Routes A and C are valued higher in the RUM model than in the 13 RRM model as a result of their higher choice probabilities. Since alternative A is the most expensive 14 alternative in the choice set, its RRM-based CS is particularly low due to the high level of marginal 15 regret caused by price increases (i.e. the tax levy). As expected Route B is valued higher by the RRM 16 model than by the RUM model due to being a compromise alternative. The additional popularity of 1 Route B results in a €0.14 increase in consumer surplus (existence value). Despite being cheap, 2 alternative C is not very popular in both the RUM and RRM model and is therefore assigned a rather 3 low consumer surplus in both models. 4 5 Robb (1986,1990 ) method with 10,000 draws from the original variance covariance matrix of parameter estimates.
7
Also for the second choice set the consumer surplus measures differ across alternatives and 8 behavioural models. For example, having access to Route A is valued €4.14 by the RUM model and 9 €4.49 by the RRM model. The higher value of Route A in the RRM model can be explained by its 10 higher choice probability and good performance in terms of price (implying a low marginal regret for 11 marginal price increases caused by the tax levy). Again, this results in lower choice probabilities, and 12
hence access values, for the other two routes relative to the RUM model. 13 14
Changes in the travel time on a route 15
We illustrate the use of (10) by respectively improving and deteriorating (see Tables 4 and 5 ) the 16 average travel time of the routes presented in Table 2 by five minutes. 8 The non-linearity of (10) with 17 respect to average travel time implies that the obtained welfare effects are alternative and choice set 1 specific irrespective of the selected model. We start by comparing the size of welfare gains and losses 2 within the RUM, respectively the RRM model. Then differences between the size of welfare gains 3 predicted by the two models are discussed, and we conclude by making the same comparison for 4 welfare losses which result from deteriorations in travel time. Tables 4 and 5 , our data also display this size difference for the RRM model. 11
The latter is, however, not theoretically guaranteed but after evaluating the entire design we only find 12 two out of twenty-seven cases where the predicted welfare loss is larger than the predicted welfare 13 gain in the RRM model. 9 In those two cases the altered alternative is already fast, cheap and also 14 performs top notch on the other attributes. Improvements then only induce an incremental change in 15 choice probability, while the RRM model starts putting more weight on deteriorations in attribute 16 performance due to increasing levels of marginal regret. 17
18
The convexity of the regret function explains why differences between the welfare gains predicted by 19 the RUM and RRM model are largest when alternatives are improved on attributes on which they are 20 already well performing. For example, the welfare gain for alternative A in choice set 1 predicted the 21 RUM model is about 49% larger than its RRM model counterpart (see Table 4 ). Similarly, Route C 22 obtains a 32% higher welfare gain in the RUM model in the second choice set (see Table 5 ). Note that 23 the 95% confidence intervals for the RUM and RRM model are non-overlapping in these two 24
examples. The RRM model tempers these welfare gains, because performing extremely well is not 25 valued much higher than performing well, i.e. marginal regret approaches zero for good performing 26 attributes. These differences between the RUM and RRM model are amplified even further when the 1 altered alternative already has a high choice probability in the original situation, as the other 2 alternatives in the choice set will then turn out to be somewhat irrelevant in defining welfare impacts. 3 4
The differences in welfare gains between the RUM and RRM model reduce in magnitude when an 5 alternative other than the fastest one is improved in terms of travel time. It can even be the case that 6 RRM predicts a higher welfare gain than the RUM model, although such differences are non-7 significant in our data, when the slowest alternative is improved. Route C in the first choice set is an 8 example of such an alternative. Again, this is a direct result of the convexity of the regret function, 9 which puts much emphasis on not performing worse than competing alternatives, on a given attribute. 10 11 Robb (1986,1990 ) method with 10,000 draws from the original variance covariance matrix of parameter estimates.
4
The tendency of the RRM model to put more weight on (relatively) bad attribute performances also 5 explains why we typically observe that the ratio of welfare effects of the RUM over the RRM model 6 decreases when switching from welfare gains to welfare losses. Route C in choice set one and Route B 7 in the second choice set are exceptions where we observe an increase in the ratio after deteriorating the 8 performance of the slowest alternative. 9
Route C in choice set one and Route B in the second choice set are already associated with a low 1 choice probability, where the RRM provides an additional `penalty' for bad attribute performance (see 2   Table 3 ). Further deteriorating the performance of these two routes does not affect choice probabilities 3 that much, since both routes remain very unpopular in both RUM and RRM. However, the higher 4 initial choice probability for RUM allows for a larger welfare effect. 5 6 It can be considered remarkable that differences in welfare predictions between the RUM and RRM 7 model particularly arise in extreme scenarios. That is, RUM predicts larger welfare effects than RRM 8 when improving popular alternatives on attributes which are already outperforming those of the other 9 alternatives; RRM shows larger (negative) welfare effects when relatively popular alternatives are 10 deteriorated in the one or few attribute(s) on which they are already performing poorly. Despite the 11 subtleness -especially when applied in the context of RRM models -of the consumer surplus 12 measure, these patterns can be traced back to the properties (i.e. convexity) of the regret function and 13 the implied preference for middle-of-the-road, as opposed to extreme, attribute performance. 14 Noteworthy is that welfare implications of small changes in the attributes of compromise alternatives, 15 which receive a higher choice share in RRM models (and have been shown in the previous section to 16 have a higher existence value for regret minimisers), are comparable between the RUM and RRM 17 model. This is a result of the fact that the implications of the asymmetric regret function are less 18 pronounced at intermediate attribute levels. 19 20 As a final note, and before we discuss limitations of the proposed approach, it is worth emphasizing 21
here that the differences between RUM and RRM in terms of the value of alternatives and in the 22 welfare effects of changes in attribute values, are larger than what might be expected given the small 23 difference in model fit between the two models. This finding is in line with the more general 24 observation (e.g., Chorus et al. 2014 ) that despite the fact that RRM and RUM often differ hardly in 25 terms of model fit, application of the two models can lead to markedly different policy implications 10 . 26
Limitations of RRM-based consumer surplus
1 Section 4 illustrated that the proposed method can be successfully applied to derive a measure of 2 (changes in) the consumer surplus (existence value) of specific alternatives within a specific choice 3 context. A direct result of using a different behavioural model is that the differences in welfare and 4 welfare effects between the linear-in-parameters-and-attributes RUM and RRM model can be 5 substantial. These differences can be traced back to differences in the core behavioural properties of 6 the RRM and RUM model. Despite these promising results, there are, however, issues regarding the 7 interpretation of the obtained RRM welfare measures, and limitations regarding the applicability of the 8 proposed method. Both will be discussed in this section. 9 10
Total surplus and aggregation bias 11
The proposed measure for changes in consumer surplus (following changes in attribute levels of an 12 alternative) that was put forward in Section 3.3 entirely focus on the existence value of alternative i. 13 For the RUM model this is inconsequential, since only the utility of alternative i is affected by changes 14 in its attribute levels. Therefore, (10) also represents the change in total consumer surplus (i.e., at the 15 choice set level) for the RUM model. In the RRM model, the attribute levels of alternative i, however, 16 also enter the regret function of the other alternatives in the choice set. Accordingly, (10) does not 17 capture changes in the existence value of the other alternatives in the choice set. Without looking into 18 the relevant equations, we already know that changes in x im by definition have an opposite effect on R i 19 and R j . Improvements in x im translate into a reduction in R i and an increase in R j . Hence, when ∆CS i >0 20 (i.e., when a single attribute of alternative i is improved) the proposed measure of the (change in) 21
consumer surplus for the altered alternative represents an upper bound on the change in the total 22 surplus in the choice set, since the decrease in existence value of the other alternatives is not taken into 23 account Similarly, when ∆CS i <0 (i.e., when a single attribute is deteriorated) a lower bound on the 24 total welfare effects in the choice set is attained. Note that the change in consumer surplus of 25 alternative i in (10) provides the largest possible effect on the total surplus. Namely, the lower bound 26 on attribute deteriorations implies that in absolute terms the welfare loss in the choice set will be 1 smaller than the obtained bound, i.e. closer to zero. alternatives from the set, by means of repeatedly levying taxes in the way described before. After 5 having established the value for alternative i the price of a second (arbitrary) alternative can be 6 gradually raised to derive the consumer surplus of this particular alternative. 12 The process can be 7 repeated until all but one arbitrarily selected alternatives are removed from the choice set. The 8 inability of McConnell's method to value the only remaining alternative in the choice set introduces an 9 aggregation bias to both the RUM and RRM model. In the linear-in-income RUM model, the size of 10 the aggregation bias can be calculated using the utility of the remaining alternative divided by the 11 marginal utility of income. This is, however, impossible in the RRM model in the absence of a 12 marginal regret of income. Path dependency thereby also precludes the identification of welfare effects of simultaneous changes 1 in the attribute levels of multiple alternatives in the choice set. Indeed, the value of alternative i 2 changes due to changes in its own attributes as well as in those of a competing alternative z. We can 3 define a change in value for the distinct alternatives i and z using (10). The implications on the joint 4 surplus for i and z, however, varies with the adopted tax path from (0,0) to (∞,∞). Furthermore, the 5 opposite directional effect of changes in i (or z) on the regret of the other alternatives in the choice sets 6 precludes setting bounds on the overall implications of the change on the total surplus of the choice 7 set. 8 9
Despite the limitations discussed in this section, we believe that the proposed measure constitutes a 10 step forward for RRM-based welfare analysis as it allows researchers to compute the existence value 11 of specific alternatives and the impact of changes in the alternative's attributes on its existence value. 12 Furthermore, the proposed measure provides insight into the impact on total consumer surplus (i.e., the 13 value of the full choice set) of changes in the attributes of a specific alternative. Although the latter 14 measure only provides a bound on the maximum welfare implications of such a change, this is much 15 more informative than having no information at all regarding the resulting welfare implications. behavioural, rather than axiomatic underpinning, the model's capacity to conduct welfare analysis is 22 yet to be determined, but very likely to be considerably more limited than that of conventional 23 AIRUM models. At first sight, the absence of a marginal regret of income even precludes a 24 meaningful RRM-based welfare analysis. In this paper however, we show that observed behavioural 25 responses to price changes can be applied to approximate certain specific Marshallian measures of 26 consumer surplus. 27 1 The proposed method interprets the RRM-based choice probability 'as if' it represents a probabilistic 2 demand function. It should, however, be noted that in contrast to RUM models, the RRM-based 3 indirect utility function has no direct utility function counterpart which adheres to the principles as set 4 out by Batley and Ibanez (2013a) . Nevertheless, the choice probability is the best and most well-5 behaved approximation available of how consumers respond to price and quality changes in a discrete 6 choice context. Following the tradition in microeconomics, measuring the area underneath the 7 probabilistic demand function up to a choke price assigns an existence value to an alternative in the 8 context of a particular choice set. The capability of the RRM model to account for choice set 9 composition effects is clearly reflected in the predicted consumer surplus measures and their 10 differences from RUM-counterparts. For example, the RRM model assigns a higher value to so-called 11 compromise alternatives as it favours intermediate -as opposed to extreme -performance on the 12 different attributes characterizing an alternative, relative to the attributes of competing alternatives. 13
Changes in the value of an alternative as a result of changes in its attribute levels can also be valued 14 using the same method, where the method becomes simpler when a price change is considered. We 15 find that differences between the welfare effects predicted by the RUM and RRM model are largest 16 when alternatives are improved on attributes on which they are already performing well. These 17 findings are again in line with differences in behavioural premises underlying RUM and RRM models, 18 in the sense that the convexity of the RRM model tempers such welfare gains, compared to the RUM 19 model. In most other cases, the differences between the RUM and RRM welfare effects are more 20 comparable, but also these more subtle differences can still be traced back to the core properties of the 21 RRM model. 22 23 We discuss in what ways the developed welfare measure is incomplete. Indeed, it only focuses on the 24 change in surplus for the altered alternative and not the change in total surplus; aggregation bias and 25 path dependency prevent the quantification of these overall welfare implications for the entire choice 26 set, i.e. the net welfare effect. When unidirectional changes in the attribute levels are introduced, we 27 are however able to set an upper bound on the resulting welfare gains and losses in the entire choice 28 set. Note that these bounds differ from the theoretical bounds discussed by Batley and Dekker (2017) ; 1 Morey (1994); and McFadden (1995) which are related to the possibility of switching across 2 alternatives; here these bounds arise because the actual regret of unaltered alternatives is affected by 3 improving a particular environmental alternative. The latter could potentially prevent a priori 4 knowledge on the direction of the net welfare effect. The issue is closely related to the non-5 monotonicity of the expected minimum regret in the RRM model (Chorus 2012) . A second limitation 6 of the method is the impossibility to value changes in the attributes of multiple alternatives as non-7 unique welfare estimates will in that case be obtained due to path dependency. Nevertheless, this paper 8 provides researchers a tool to quantify certain welfare implications based on the RRM model. These 9 limitations, however, significantly limit the application of the RRM model in combination with social 10 welfare measurement, leaving the researcher with the inevitable trade-off between behavioural 11 relevance and economic theory based social welfare analysis. 
